Institute for Child Custody Advocacy · One record, read closely
Without Accountability, Orleans Family Court Can Act Untethered from Reality
Bridget Neal argues that Orleans Family Court restricted her contact with her children without requiring competent evidence or enforcing candor from the Officers of the Court. This page examines the records she cites in support of that argument.
A court tethered to reality needs three things. Competent evidence before any consequence. Candor it enforces, so that what is said in the courtroom can be tested. Accountability, so that an error is corrected rather than compounded. Take those away and a court can find anything, because nothing holds its findings to the facts.
Evidence · Candor · Accountability
What Neal challenges
In her petition, Neal alleges that attorney Suzanne Bayle introduced false statements and that custody evaluator Kristen Luscher repeated them under professional authority. Neal contends that the court relied on those statements without requiring competent supporting evidence.
Neal describes this as fraud upon the court. Her criticism is directed both at the people who supplied the disputed narrative and at the Orleans judiciary that gave it consequences for her family.
Evidence before consequence
A court should require competent evidence before restricting parent-child contact.
Neal’s account: Statements supplied by counsel stood in for evidence, while paid professionals repeated what they had been told.
Candor that can be tested
Statements made in court must be tested and corrected when they are false.
Neal’s petition: The evaluator repeated a psychiatric narrative under professional authority that Neal’s medical records and treating psychiatrist’s testimony contradicted.
Accountability for error
Reasons should be given, and errors corrected through review.
Neal’s account: Restrictions accumulated instead. Each consequence rested on the one before it, while the underlying evidentiary dispute remained unresolved.
How the record was built
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The withholding
Neal’s petition alleges that in 2017, a year after the divorce, Nagarajan began withholding the children despite an existing equal-custody judgment, and that Orleans Family Court permitted it to continue.
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The post hoc explanation
Her petition alleges that privately paid professionals, including co-parenting therapist Tim Kemery and custody evaluator Kristen Luscher, supplied post hoc justifications for the withholding.
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The insertion
Neal alleges that attorney Suzanne Bayle placed the disputed narrative into the court record.
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The ratification
Her petition alleges that Luscher repeated the narrative under professional authority while also serving as the privately paid enforcer of the 2019 stipulation.
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Judicial force
In Neal’s account, the 2019 stipulation controlled where she could live, whether she could have a home with her children in New Orleans, and whether she could work. She contends that the Family Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal gave that control judicial force.
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Consequences that compound
Neal’s criticism is that a purchased narrative produced restrictions sustained under the broad “best interest of the child” standard, without requiring the underlying claims to meet a threshold of competent evidence.
2022 trial testimony
What the same people proposed next
Recommendations, not an adopted order
The 2022 recommendations shown below were not adopted. Neal explains that there was no workable way to monitor compliance. The maps distinguish those proposals from provisions of the 2019 consent judgment.
That distinction does not answer Neal’s objection: the same professionals whose statements she challenges as fraud upon the court proposed additional barriers to even supervised contact with her children. She argues that a family court construct that entertains such conditions without first requiring competent evidence can destroy families and lives.
Map 1 · The scale of the proposal
12 weekly sessions
Proposed before any supervised visit.
2022 testimony: Tr. 88:25–32; 89:29–32.
At least 12 months
Psychotherapy weekly or more often as recommended, and longer if warranted. The 2019 judgment separately provided an initial 12-month term.
2022 testimony: Tr. 85:25–86:29. 2019 judgment: p. 9, ¶ a.
Map 2 · The route described in the testimony
- 01
Temporary sole custody
The proposal placed temporary sole custody with Nagarajan, with supervised visitation after Neal began psychotherapy.
Tr. 88:14–24.
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Twelve weekly sessions
Twelve sessions were proposed before even supervised contact.
Tr. 88:25–32; 89:29–32.
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Proof of gains, without an identified monitor
The discussion did not identify who would receive the proof or how that monitoring system would work.
Tr. 90:13–91:7.
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Supervised contact and further therapy
The recommendations described supervision by a paid mental health professional and reporting of problematic behavior to the therapist, followed by family therapy.
Tr. 90:1–12; 91:8–94:1.
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A possible return to the existing schedule
The proposal described a return after appropriate therapeutic gains across twelve months, with the burden on Neal to show the court. It proposed continued sole custody for Nagarajan if she did not participate in psychotherapy.
Tr. 97:4–98:12.
These are descriptions of recommendations discussed in testimony. They are not a list of requirements imposed by a later judgment.
2019 consent judgment
Map 3 · Who held each decision
The earlier judgment is a separate source. The following provisions show the decision-making roles that Neal challenges.
A different provider
Luscher and Nagarajan jointly approved an alternative provider. Ending therapy after the initial twelve months involved the treating psychologist in consultation with Luscher.
2019 judgment, p. 9, ¶ a.
More time with the children
Written certification from Neal’s treatment providers and Luscher, with the children’s therapists in agreement.
2019 judgment, p. 10, ¶ d.
More restrictive custody
Luscher could recommend more restrictive custody, binding pending a court order.
2019 judgment, p. 10, ¶ e.
Payment and enforcement
Nagarajan approved therapy rates in writing and paid providers directly; approval was not to be unreasonably withheld for rates within industry norms. Other provisions permitted reclassification or termination of Neal’s monthly payment following a material-breach determination by Luscher or the parenting coordinator, binding pending court review.
2019 judgment, p. 10, ¶ c; pp. 12–13.
Map 4 · How Neal says the restrictions operated
Neal’s allegation: Withholding was followed by paid professional ratification. Her attempts to tell her children that she had not abandoned them were then characterized as negative behavior supporting restrictions.
The 2022 recommendations described a possible return to the existing custody schedule. Neal disputes whether the conditions provided a workable, objectively defined path to that return. They were not adopted, but she argues that the proposal itself exposes the absence of accountability in the family court construct.
Against that accumulated burden, Neal asks what “more restrictive” means for a mother already separated from her children and facing proposed conditions for even supervised contact.
Evidence before consequence
Justice is not a marketplace.
Act 552 of 2024 strengthened custody-evaluator qualifications, reporting and discovery protections, and expressly applied existing Code of Evidence standards to expert testimony. A law is only as good as its execution in the courtroom.
For the 2027 Regular Session, the Institute seeks three safeguards:
- Evidence before separation. No order should restrict a parent’s contact with a child on an unsupported allegation alone.
- A defined path back to contact. Conditions must identify the finding, completion criteria, decision-maker, deadline, and contact that follows completion.
- A meaningful opportunity to challenge expert evidence, regardless of means.
